UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-12-2016

State v. Hoagland Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42396

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hoagland Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42396" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5616.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5616

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 42396
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Canyon Co. Case No.
v.
) CR-2005-136
)
ALDEN LAMAR HOAGLAND, JR.,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P. O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 334-2712

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case..................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
Hoagland Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of
His Rule 35 Motion .................................................................................... 5
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5

C.

The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over The Sexual Abuse Of A Child Charge To
Which Hoagland Pled Guilty ........................................................... 5

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Applewhite v. State, 597 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) ......................... 12
Brown v. State, 159 Idaho 496, 363 P.3d 337 (2015) .................................... 9, 10
Byrd v. Twomery, 277 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) ........................................ 13
Frisbie v. U.S., 157 U.S. 160 (1895) ................................................................... 12
Gasper v. Dist. Ct. of Seventh Judicial Dist.,
74 Idaho 388, 264 P.2d 679 (1953) ......................................................... 13
Goulden v. State, 299 So.2d 325 (Ala. 1974) ..................................................... 13
Humphrey v. Lynaugh, 861 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1988) .......................................... 13
Justice v. McMackin, 558 N.E.2d 1183 (Ohio 1990)........................................... 13
People v. Curry, 210 N.W.2d 791 (Mich.App. 1973) .......................................... 10
Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2006) .......................................... 10
State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 828 P.2d 1316 (1992) ......................................... 6
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011) .................................. passim
State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995) ...................... 10
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004) ........................................... 6
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 252 P.3d 1255 (2011) ....................................... 5, 9
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621 (2016) .................................. 6, 8, 9
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967) ................................... 12
State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 292 P.3d 282 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................ 7
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004) ..................................... 6, 7
State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 367 P.3d 163 (2016) ........................... passim
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 695, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ..................................... 6
ii

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) .................................................... 10
West v. State, 92 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 1950) ........................................................... 13
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-1304 ..................................................................................................... 12
I.C. § 19-1401 ..................................................................................................... 12
I.C. § 19-1419 ............................................................................................... 12, 13
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Idaho Const. art. I, § 8 .......................................................................................... 6

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alden Lamar Hoagland, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order denying
his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Hoagland on one count of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508, based upon its finding that
Hoagland:
did willfully and lewdly, commit a lewd and/or lascivious act upon
and/or with the body of a minor, J.H., under the age of sixteen
years, to-wit: of the age of eight (8) years …, by having manual to
genital and/or manual to buttocks contact with the intent to arouse,
appeal to and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of the
defendant and/or said minor child.
(R., pp.16-17; see also R., pp.29-35 (indictment amended to correct victim’s date
of birth).) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hoagland agreed to plead guilty to an
amended charge of sexual abuse of a child. (R., pp.40-43; 5/2/05 Tr., p.4, L.13
– p.5, L.1.) To facilitate the parties’ agreement, the district court amended an
unsigned copy of the indictment by interlineation, striking out the language and
code section charging lewd conduct and replacing it with the relevant code
section and language charging sexual abuse. (R., pp.34-35; see also 5/2/05 Tr.,
p.5, L.3 – p.6, L.20.)

Specifically, as interlineated, the amended document

charged:
ALDEN HOAGLAND, JR. is accused by the Grand Jury of
Canyon County, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of Child Under
Sixteen, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-1506(b) committed as
follows:
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COUNT I
That the Defendant, ALDEN L. HOAGLAND, JR., on a date
certain between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2004, in the County
of Canyon, State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with a minor,
J.H., under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the age of eight (8)
years … by having manual to genital and/or manual to buttocks
contact with the intent to arouse, appeal to and/or gratify the lust,
passion and/or sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor
child.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Codes Section 18-1506(b)
and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
(R., pp.34-35.) In response to the court’s inquiry whether “the defense waives
any issues concerning the amending of a grand jury indictment,” defense
counsel stated, “Judge, we’ll stipulate that these amendments can be filed.”
(5/2/05 Tr., p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.1.) The court thereafter accepted Hoagland’s plea
to the amended charge (R., pp.40-43; 5/2/05 Tr., p.7, L.2 – p.12, L.16) and
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three and one-half years fixed (R.,
pp.54-55). Hoagland filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence,
which the district court denied. (R., pp.56-59, 72-80.)
Several years later, on July 29, 2013, Hoagland filed a Rule 35 motion for
correction of an illegal sentence. (R., pp.81-87.) Hoagland did not argue that his
sentence for sexual abuse of a child was in excess of the statutorily prescribed
sentence for that crime. Instead, he argued the court never had jurisdiction over
the sexual abuse charge because that charge was never submitted to a grand
jury. (See id.) The district court denied Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion, ruling that
because the amended indictment charged the same operative facts as those
found by the grand jury in relation to the original indictment, the jurisdiction
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imparted by the original indictment extended to the amended charge.
pp.140-50.) Hoagland timely appealed. (R., pp.151-54.)

3

(R.,

ISSUE
Hoagland states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoagland’s I.C.R. 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence?
(Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hoagland failed to show the district court erred in denying his Rule 35
motion for correction of an illegal sentence?
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ARGUMENT
Hoagland Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
Hoagland challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion for correction of an

illegal sentence, arguing as he did below that the trial court never had subject
matter jurisdiction over the sexual abuse charge to which he pled guilty.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-12.) Specifically, he contends the amended indictment
was jurisdictionally defective because it “charged him with a different crime than
the original indictment and was not endorsed by the foreman of the grand jury or
the prosecutor.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Correct application of the law shows
Hoagland’s arguments are without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[W]hether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion” are

questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Schmierer,
159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016).

“Jurisdiction is likewise a

question of law and is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Lute, 150 Idaho
837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011)).
C.

The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The Sexual Abuse
Of A Child Charge To Which Hoagland Pled Guilty
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute.” State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255,
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).

Idaho courts have “subject matter

jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the
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result, occurs within Idaho.” State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316,
1319 (1992). “The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court.” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004), quoted
in State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, ___, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016); see also Idaho
Const. art. I, § 8 (“No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal
offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on
information of the public prosecutor[.]”). “‘Since the indictment or information
provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the court’s jurisdictional power
depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge.’”
State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (quoting State
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702 (2004)).

“‘To be legally

sufficient, a charging document must meet two requirements: it must impart
jurisdiction and satisfy due process.’” Id. (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
695, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009)).
Contrary to Hoagland’s assertions on appeal, application of the foregoing
legal principles to the facts of this case shows the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the charge to which Hoagland pled guilty. The amended
indictment alleged Hoagland committed “Sexual Abuse of Child Under Sixteen, a
felony,” in violation of “Idaho Code Section 18-1506(b).”

(R., pp.34-35.)

Because the amended indictment alleged an offense committed within the State
of Idaho, it imparted the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the
sexual abuse charge. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428 (“An
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indictment confers jurisdiction when it alleges that the defendant committed a
criminal offense in the State of Idaho.”); Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at
1132 (a “complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court”); State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891,
893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012) (a charging document “confers
jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense within the
State of Idaho”). Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over
the sexual abuse charge, the court correctly denied Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion
that sought to vacate his conviction and sentence based upon an alleged lack of
jurisdiction.
Relying on State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011), Hoagland
argues the amended indictment was jurisdictionally defective because it charged
an offense different than that alleged in the original indictment without first being
submitted to a grand jury.

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Hoagland’s reliance on

Flegel for the proposition that a prosecutor can never amend a charging
document to allege a new or different offense without first submitting the new
charge to a grand jury or to a magistrate for a finding of probable cause betrays
a misunderstanding both of the facts and holding of Flegel and of the distinction
between the concepts of jurisdiction and due process, generally.
In Flegel, a grand jury indicted the defendant for the crime of lewd
conduct. 151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520. At trial, the court instructed the jury
on the elements of lewd conduct and on sexual abuse as an included offense.
Id. The jury acquitted Flegel of lewd conduct but could not reach a verdict on
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sexual abuse. Id. The state thereafter filed an amended indictment charging
Flegel with sexual abuse, but did not submit that charge to the grand jury. Id. A
jury found Flegel guilty of sexual abuse following his retrial. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that sexual abuse is not
an included offense of lewd conduct and held that the “prosecuting attorney had
no authority,” after the jury acquitted Flegel of the only charge alleged in the
original indictment, “to issue an amended indictment for a crime that was not
charged in the original indictment and that was not an included offense of that
crime.” Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520; see also McIntosh, 160 Idaho
at ___, 368 P.3d at 627 (“In Flegel, we held that an amended indictment was
invalid because the State could not amend an indictment after the jury had
acquitted the defendant of the crime charged in the indictment in order to include
a non-included offense without first submitting it to the grand jury and filing a new
information [sic].”). The Court reasoned that, “To allow a prosecutor to amend
an indictment to charge an offense other than that for which the defendant was
held to answer would permit the prosecutor to, in essence, become the grand
jury.”

Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526-527, 261 P.3d at 520-521.

“Because the

amended indictment charged a different crime than the crime charged in the
original indictment,” and because sexual abuse is not a lesser included offense
of lewd conduct, “the amended indictment [was] a nullity,” and “the district court
never had subject matter jurisdiction” over the sexual abuse charge. Id. at 53031, 261 P.3d at 524-25.
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The facts of Flegel are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case.
The prosecutor in Flegel unilaterally filed an amended indictment charging a nonincluded offense after a jury had acquitted Flegel of the only crime alleged in the
original indictment. The amended indictment was invalid and, thus, failed to
impart jurisdiction, because the prosecutor “had no authority” to file a new
charge, without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, after the original
indictment was effectively a dead letter. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31, 261 P.3d
at 524-25; McIntosh, 160 Idaho at ___, 368 P.3d at 627; see also Lute, 150
Idaho at 841, 252 P.3d at 1259 (2011) (where the grand jury term had expired,
“a valid indictment was never entered against Lute, the district court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over Lute’s case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution.”). Here, in contrast, the original indictment giving the district court
subject matter jurisdiction remained in full force and effect up to the moment the
court amended the indictment with Hoagland’s consent. That the charge was
amended without resubmission to a grand jury did not divest the district court of
jurisdiction because, unlike in Flegel, the prosecutor and/or court in this case had
“authority” to amend the charge without a new probable cause finding pursuant
to Hoagland’s consent.

See Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166

(citing Brown v. State, 159 Idaho 496, 497 n.2, 363 P.3d 337, 338 n.2 (2015))
(“Although the charging document was issued without a preliminary examination,
a defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination by pleading guilty
without objection.”).

9

In arguing that Flegel requires resubmission to a grand jury in every case
where an indictment is amended to allege a new offense, Hoagland
misapprehends the distinction between jurisdiction and due process. Article 1,
section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal defendants facing a
felony charge the right to a finding of probable cause either by a grand jury or by
a magistrate following a preliminary hearing. See Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___,
367 P.3d at 165; State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App.
1995). As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, however, the right to
a probable cause determination is not jurisdictional but may instead be waived
by a valid guilty plea.

Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (“a

defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination by pleading guilty without
objection”); Brown, 159 Idaho at 497 n.2, 363 P.3d at 338 n.2.

1

Unlike the defendant in Flegel, who was deprived without his consent of a
grand jury finding of probable cause for a new offense after being acquitted of
the only charge alleged in the original indictment, Hoagland consented to the

1

Although Schmierer and Brown both involved the waiver of a preliminary
hearing, there is no principled basis to distinguish between the waiver of a
probable cause finding by a magistrate and the waiver of a probable cause
finding by a grand jury; in fact, other courts that have considered the issue have
expressly held that the right to a grand jury may be waived. See United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (“In contrast” to defects in subject-matter
jurisdiction, “the grand jury right can be waived.”); Short v. United States, 471
F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In light of this modern shift in the procedural rules
and recent caselaw, we conclude that a defendant may waive his right to
reindictment by a grand jury. We confine this holding, however, to the present
circumstance concerning a guilty plea to the amended indictment ….”); People v.
Curry, 210 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Mich.App. 1973) (holding that, where the
indictment was amended to charge a new offense, “the trial court had jurisdiction
to accept defendant’s plea to the amended indictment.”).
10

amendment of the indictment to allege sexual abuse of a child, instead of lewd
conduct, to take advantage of the plea agreement in this case. Hoagland had
the right to waive a probable cause determination by the grand jury on the
amended charge, and, unlike the defendant in Flegel, he expressly did so by
“stipulat[ing]” to the amendment and pleading guilty. (See 5/2/05 Tr., p.6, L.22 –
p.12, L.16.) There is nothing about the amended sexual abuse charge or the
manner in which probable cause was established (i.e., by waiver) that divested
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over that charge.2
In addition to complaining about the lack of a grand jury finding of
probable cause, Hoagland argues the amended indictment “was insufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court” because it “was not signed
by anyone and therefore did not meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-1401.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Hoagland does not even attempt to explain why the
lack of a signature is a jurisdictional defect. Nor could he successfully do so
because, whether the amended charging document is viewed as an amended
indictment or a mislabeled information, correct application of the law shows the
lack of a signature thereon was merely a defect in form and did not implicate the
court’s jurisdiction.

2

The district court concluded submission of the amended charge to the grand
jury was not required because the amended charge was based on the same
operative facts as the charge contained in the original indictment. (R., pp.44-49.)
The state agrees with the district court’s analysis and hereby incorporates it by
reference. The state submits, however, that where, as here, the defendant
consented to a an amendment of the charging document to take advantage of a
plea agreement, the fact that the amendment charges an entirely new crime is
irrelevant and does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
11

When an indictment is found by a grand jury, “it must be endorsed, a true
bill, and the endorsement must be signed by the foreman of the grand jury.”
I.C. § 19-1401.

“Contrastingly, an information must be endorsed by the

prosecutor ….” Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (citing, inter alia,
I.C. § 19-1302). While compliance with these statutory requirements is obviously
preferred, nothing in the statute or relevant case law indicates the lack of an
endorsement on a charging document is a jurisdictional defect. In fact, Idaho
Code § 19-1419 specifically contemplates that not all indictments will comply
perfectly with every statutorily mandated pleading requirement.

That statute,

governing the effect of defects of form of indictments, states that “[n]o indictment
is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon, be
affected, by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does
not tend to the prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits.”
I.C. § 19-1419. The statute applies equally to defects of form in informations.
Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (citing I.C. § 19-1304; State v.
McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 818, 430 P.2d 886, 896 (1967)).
That the lack of an endorsement is a defect in form, and not a
jurisdictional defect, finds support in a number of cases. Indeed, over a century
ago the Supreme Court of the United States explained that the lack of an
endorsement or signature of the foreman is not jurisdictional, and that there was
“general unanimity of the authorities to this effect.” Frisbie v. U.S., 157 U.S. 160,
163-65 (1895); see also Applewhite v. State, 597 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1979) (recognizing signature of the grand jury foreman was
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mandatory under state statute, but adopting the majority rule that the omission
was not jurisdictional, explaining “foreman’s signature has come to be viewed as
a procedural safeguard rather than a substantive requisite of an indictment, such
that its presence or absence does not materially affect any substantial right of
the defendant; and … neither assures to him nor prevents him from having a fair
trial”); Humphrey v. Lynaugh, 861 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1988) (the foreman’s
failure to sign the indictment was not jurisdictional); Justice v. McMackin, 558
N.E.2d 1183, 1183 (Ohio 1990) (“A grand jury foreman’s failure to sign the
indictment does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.”); Goulden v. State, 299
So.2d 325, 326 (Ala. 1974) (“The failure of the foreman of the grand jury to
endorse the indictment as a true bill did not deprive the circuit court of
jurisdiction.”); Byrd v. Twomery, 277 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (same);
West v. State, 92 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ind. 1950) (same).
In Gasper v. Dist. Ct. of Seventh Judicial Dist., 74 Idaho 388, 392, 264
P.2d 679, 681 (1953), the defendant contended the indictment was not
“endorsed and presented as prescribed in § 19-1401, I.C.” because the foreman
failed to sign the endorsement. After explaining the contents of the indictment
and that the foreman’s signature was on the indictment elsewhere, the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded “this is a sufficient and substantial compliance with
the statute” because “[t]he defect here is a matter of form which does not tend to
prejudice any substantial rights of the defendant.” Id. at 392-93 (citing I.C. § 191419).

Gasper indicates that the failure to follow I.C. § 19-1401 is not

jurisdictional.

More importantly, it establishes that errors associated with
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I.C. § 19-1401 do not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, but are
merely a “defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does not tend to the
prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits.” Id.
The error associated with the lack of an endorsement on the amended
indictment charging Hoagland with sexual abuse was merely a defect in form
and did not prejudice Hoagland’s substantial rights. Hoagland consented to the
amendment of the indictment and the amendment was accomplished in open
court while Hoagland was present. Although it would have been better practice
for the prosecutor to have signed the amended charging document, Hoagland
has not even argued, much less established, that the omission affected the
fairness of the proceedings. Nor has he shown any reason why, to this day, the
lack of an endorsement could not be corrected by the mere the expedient of
having the prosecutor sign the document nunc pro tunc. Because the record
shows Hoagland was not prejudiced by the lack of an endorsement on the
amended charging document, the error was “a mere defect of form and [did] not
deprive the court of jurisdiction” over the amended charge.

Schmierer, 159

Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Hoagland has failed to show the district
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual abuse of a child charge to
which he pled guilty. Having failed to make that showing, Hoagland has failed to
show the court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion that sought to vacate his
conviction and sentence for lack of jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.
DATED this 12th day of July, 2016.
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming______
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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electronic copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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